Kentucky Law Survey: Evidence by Bryant, Winifred
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 69 | Issue 3 Article 7
1980
Kentucky Law Survey: Evidence
Winifred Bryant
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bryant, Winifred (1980) "Kentucky Law Survey: Evidence," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 69 : Iss. 3 , Article 7.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol69/iss3/7
EVIDENCE
By WINIFRED BRYANT*
I. HEARSAY
A. Statements of Co-Conspirators
Rule 801(d) (2) (E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence
(FRE) provides that an out-of-court statement is not hearsay
if "offered against a party and is ... a statement by a co-
conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy."1 While this rule is clearly stated, the federal
courts of appeals have grappled in recent years with practical
problems associated with its implementation. These problems
have developed because of the unexpressed but obvious re-
quirement within the rule that before a co-conspirator's state-
ment may be introduced into evidence, it must be determined
that a conspiracy actually existed. This requirement raises
three concerns: 1) the method to be used by the court in mak-
ing this determination; 2) the quantum of proof required; and
3) when the determination is to be made. The Sixth Circuit
recently dealt with these questions in two important cases:
United States v. Enright2 and United States v. Vinson.
3
Enright involved the introduction into evidence of re-
corded conversations between an alleged co-conspirator of de-
fendant Chief of Police Enright and an undercover policeman.
Recorded during the course of the alleged conspiracy, these
* J.D. 1981, University of Kentucky. The author appreciates the assistance of
Professor William H. Fortune in the preparation of this survey article.
I In most jurisdictions, statements by co-conspirators are admitted into evidence
as exceptions to the hearsay rule. R. LAWSON, KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK
139 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LAWSON]. The federal rule differs from the common
law rule in that under the federal rule, statements by co-conspirators are not consid-
ered to be hearsay at all.
2 579 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978).
3 606 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074, reh. denied, 100 S. Ct.
1668 (1980). The day following its decision in Vinson, the Sixth Circuit decided yet
another case concerning the admissibility of co-conspirator testimony, United States
v. Nickerson, 606 F.2d 156 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 994 (1979). Since Nicker-
son is little more than a reiteration of those principles established in Enright and
Vinson, it will not be discussed in this survey.
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conversations clearly set forth Enright's involvement in illegal
gambling operations. The trial court admitted the recordings
into evidence upon the establishment by the government of a
prima facie case of the existence of, and Enright's participa-
tion in, the conspiracy. This procedure was consistent with
the Sixth Circuit's 1975 decision in United States v. Mayes,4
which had adopted the existing majority rule among circuits
as to the preliminary admissibility of a co-conspirator's testi-
mony. Mayes held that before a statement may be admitted
under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the
government must first establish a prima facie case of the con-
spiracy and of the defendant's connection with it."
Enright was convicted. On appeal, he contended that
Mayes should be re-examined in light of the First Circuit's
1977 decision of United States v. Petrozziello,6 which held
that the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975
dictated a more stringent standard of proof than that of the
prima facie case.7 Petrozziello specifically rejected the prima
facie test in light of FRE 104(a),8 which it found to be control-
ling. Since Rule 104(a) requires that "[p]reliminary questions
concerning . ..the admissibility of evidence shall be deter-
mined by the court, "9 the Petrozziello court reasoned that the
trial judge had a greater duty than that of merely satisfying
himself of the existence of a prima facie case. Instead, the
trial judge should resolve by a preponderance of the evi-
- 512 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975). Mayes was decided
before the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1, 1975.
' Id. at 651. The court explained what is meant by a "prima facie case" in the
following manner: "[A] prima facie case is less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt;
indeed, it is less than a preponderance. . . .Moreover, the prima facie case need not
be established before the proffered hearsay may be admitted; the judge may admit it
conditionally." Id.
6 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977).
Id. at 23.
8 FED. R. EVID. 104(a) states:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a wit-
ness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges.
9 Id. (emphasis added).
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dence10 that a conspiracy involving the defendant existed
before allowing a statement to be admitted under the co-con-
spirator rule.11
The Enright court noted, however, that the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in United States v. Ochoa,2 had reached a
different decision by employing FRE 104(b). 13 Since Rule
104(b) provides that evidence may be admitted conditionally
when its relevance "depends upon the fulfillment of a condi-
tion of fact,"14 the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the determina-
tion of the existence of a conspiracy and the defendant's con-
nection with it would be a "fulfillment of a condition of fact"
and thus Rule 104(b) applied. Having thus rejected the First
Circuit's position that Rule 104(a) and the "preponderance of
the evidence" test should be used, Ochoa reaffirmed the Fifth
Circuit's practice of admitting the evidence merely upon proof
of a prima facie case.
1 5
Unpersuaded by Ochoa's reasoning, the Sixth Circuit in
Enright adopted Petrozziello's view that Rule 104(a) should
control, stating: "The question seems to be more one of basic
reliability and fairness of admitting the evidence rather than a
relevancy question of whether the evidence has any tendency
to make a fact in issue more or less probable than it would be
10 Proof by a preponderance is proof that leads a jury to believe that the exis-
tence of a contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence. MCCORMICK, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 339 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
11 548 F.2d at 23.
12 564 F.2d 1155, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 947 (1978).
13 FED. R. EvID. 104(b) states: "When the relevancy of evidence depends upon
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition."
14 Id. (emphasis added).
5 564 F.2d at 1157 n.2. The Advisory Committee note to Rule 104(b) establishes
the procedure a trial judge is to use in implementing this rule:
The judge makes a preliminary determination whether the foundation evi-
dence is sufficient to support a finding of fulfillment of the condition. If so,
the item is admitted. If after all the evidence on the issues is in, pro and
con, the jury could reasonably conclude that fulfillment of the condition is
not established, the issue is for them. If the issue is not such as to allow a
finding, the judge withdraws the matter from their consideration.
FED. R. EvID. 104(b), Advisory Committee note (1975). It is this feature of jury par-
ticipation that distinguishes Rule 104(b) from Rule 104(a).
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without that evidence."'16 The Sixth Circuit thus determined
that the initial questions of the existence of a conspiracy and
the involvement of the defendant in that conspiracy are to be
decided solely by the trial judge under FRE 104(a). Further-
more, the court held that the trial judge should apply the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard in deciding these prelim-
inary questions:17 "[I]f it is more likely than not that the
declarant and the defendant were members of a conspiracy
when the hearsay statement was made, and that the state-
ment was in furtherance of the conspiracy, the hearsay is
admissible."' 8
The Sixth Circuit thus joined the majority of those cir-
cuits that have re-examined the standard of proof necessary
for admission of co-conspirator testimony. Since the federal
rules became effective in 1975, the Courts of Appeals for the
First,'9 Fifth,20 Seventh,21 and Eighth22 Circuits have aban-
doned the prima facie standard in favor of the more exacting
preponderance standard. While there is some skepticism as to
whether the actual test employed has any impact on the
judge's determination," the preponderance test, unlike the
16 United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d at 984, citing FED. R. EvID. 401. Rule 401
states: "Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more prob-
able or less probable that it would be without the evidence."
17 Id. at 986.
28 Id. (quoting Petrozziello, 548 F.2d at 23). The court based its rejection of the
prima facie test on its reading of Rule 104(b) (see note 13 supra for the text of this
rule). Rule 104(b), in the court's opinion, is a classic restatement of the prima facie
test. Since this language was not made part of Rule 104(a), then the prima facie test
was certainly not that contemplated by the framers of the rule. The court also re-
jected the "reasonable doubt" standard, relying on the fact that the U.S. Supreme
Court has never required this high standard of proof for the determination of the
preliminary question of admissibility of statements of co-conspirators. See United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 n.14 (1974).
16 United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977).
2 United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1978), reh. en banc, 590 F.2d
575 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
21 United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978).
22 United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1978).
21 The Second Circuit, in United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028 (1970), stated: "When the matter is viewed from
the standpoint of the trial judge, it may be hard to say more than that he must
satisfy himself of the defendant's participation in a conspiracy on the basis of the
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prima facie test, requires that the judge base his decision not
only on the government's evidence but on the defendant's
proof as well. This procedure is fairer to the defendant, who
may have proof of his non-participation in the conspiracy.
Moreover, the preponderance test appears to be that contem-
plated by the framers of the federal rules. FRE 104(a) specifi-
cally states that the trial judge shall "determine" preliminary
questions concerning the admissibility of evidence. Arguably,
a "determination" requires the weighing of both sides of an
issue.24 The prima facie test, which requires only a considera-
tion of the prosecution's evidence, is not consistent with the
concept of "determination." By thus conforming to the lan-
guage of Rule 104(a), Enright has provided an additional
measure of protection to defendants subject to potentially un-
reliable statements of co-conspirators.
One year after its decision in Enright, the Sixth Circuit
again addressed the co-conspirator issue in United States v.
Vinson.25 In Vinson, Magistrate Thompson and Sheriff Vin-
son had been indicted for conspiracy to extort money and for
extortion of money from a coal company. The district court
admitted testimony of out-of-court statements by Sheriff Vin-
son that tended to incriminate Magistrate Thompson, and in-
structed the jury that the hearsay was not to be considered as
evidence against the magistrate until "you are satisfied or the
Court makes a ruling of a prima facie case of conspiracy".2 6
The district judge later made the necessary Enright finding;
i.e., that the government had proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that the sheriff and the magistrate were involved
in a conspiracy. He then instructed the jury that his earlier
admonition concerning the evidence was now withdrawn.
Since the defendants had been charged with the offense of
non-hearsay evidence." This view was expressed in Note, Co-Conspirator Declara-
tions: Procedure and Standard of Proof for Admission Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 55 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 577, 600-01 (1978-79) (citing Geaney).
24 WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966) provides the follow-
ing definition of "determine": "to settle or decide by choice of alternatives or
possibilities."
25 606 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074, reh. denied, 100 S.
Ct. 1668 (1980).
26 Id. at 151.
1980-811
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conspiracy, they objected to the judge's statement on the
grounds that it was the equivalent of advising the jury that a
conspiracy actually existed.
Recognizing that Enright had not provided trial judges
with guidance for structuring the order of proof at trial,2 7 the
Sixth Circuit in Vinson proposed three methods by which
trial judges can allow the government to present its proof,
while protecting defendants from inadmissible hearsay: 1) the
judge may conduct a "mini-hearing" in which the government
and the defendant present their proof outside the presence of
the jury; 2) the judge may require that the government meet
its burden by producing non-hearsay evidence of conspiracy
before seeking to admit co-conspirators' statements; and 3)
the judge may admit the hearsay conditionally, as was done in
Vinson. Because of the potential prejudice to the defendant
inherent in this last method, however, the court outlined sev-
eral safeguards that a trial judge must observe if he chooses
this alternative. The court must inform the jury that the
statements are subject to the defendant's objection and that
the prosecution must prove the conspiracy by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Should the court find that the Enright
test is satisfied, then the jury can consider the conditionally
admitted hearsay. If the government fails to meet its burden,
however, the court must, on defendant's motion, declare a
mistrial, unless it is convinced that the defendant's case has
not been prejudiced by the hearsay.28
Vinson's purpose in suggesting the three above alterna-
tives was to provide trial courts with a choice, so as not to
unduly restrict the judge in his control of the order of proof at
trial.29 The first two alternatives - the "mini-hearing" and
the procedure by which the government first introduces its
non-hearsay evidence in order to meet its initial burden -
may be seen as more time-consuming than the third alterna-
tive of admitting the hearsay evidence conditionally, subject
to later demonstration of its admissibility.30 While the third
27 Id. at 152.
28 Id. at 152-53.
29 Id. at 152.
30 The court cited United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979), for its
[Vol. 69
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alternative thus may seem more appealing from the stand-
point of efficiency, its potential prejudice to the defendant
should be sufficient to persuade judges to use it sparingly. Ad-
ditionally, this third alternative may not really be more effi-
cient than the other approaches. If the government fails to
carry its burden, only two remedies are available: the judge
may give a cautionary instruction if he is convinced that this
would shield the defendant from prejudice; otherwise, he must
declare a mistrial.3 1 The potential waste of time and expense
of a mistrial is obvious. In order to avoid declaring a mistrial,
a judge might give a cautionary instruction without ade-
quately determining the risk of prejudice to the defendant. A
court would be well-advised to avoid a procedure with the po-
tential for either a mistrial or a cautionary instruction of
questionable value.32
If a court is concerned that a "mini-hearing" would be
"burdensome, time-consuming and uneconomic," as suggested
by Vinson,33 then the clearly preferable approach is to require
the government to first submit its non-hearsay proof of the
conspiracy in order for the judge to make the required En-
right finding. This approach has been recommended by the
First,3 Fifth,35 and Eighth 6 Circuits, each of which has recog-
nized that although the trial judge should retain discretion to
criticism of the "mini-hearing" as "burdensome, time-consuming and uneconomic."
606 F.2d at 152.
31 Of course, if the government has failed to prove the defendant's participation
in the conspiracy, a judgment of acquittal may be in order; the question is whether
the trial judge feels a reasonable jury could, on the basis of non-hearsay evidence,
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See FED. R. EviD. 29(a); United
States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972). It is possible for a court to find that the
government has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the defendant's
participation in the conspiracy and thus exclude the co-conspirator's statements,
while at the same time denying a motion for judgment of acquittal on the remaining
counts and holding that the case is one for the jury.
SI "In some situations ... the influence of improper testimony upon the minds
of the jury cannot... be removed by the instruction of the court." 4 GARD, JONES ON
EVIDENCE: § 24.5 (6th ed. 1972).
33 606 F.2d at 152.
" United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 n.3 (1st Cir. 1977).
s' United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1979).
36 United States v. Macklin, 573 F.2d 1046, 1049 n.3 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 852 (1978).
1980-81]
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admit hearsay subject to later demonstration of admissibility
at trial, it would be better to avoid the danger of exposing the
jury to evidence that is later declared inadmissible.
Having disposed of the question of the order of proof at
trial, the Vinson court turned to the equally important issue
of whether the judge may consider the hearsay evidence itself
in making the Enright determination of the existence of a
conspiracy. The court relied on the language of FRE 104(a),37
which states that the judge "is not bound by the rules of evi-
dence" and held that the trial judge may consider the state-
ments themselves in deciding the preliminary question of ad-
missibility. This proposition has been the subject of
considerable controversy among circuits.38 The obvious objec-
tion to the judge's consideration of the hearsay statement in
determining whether a conspiracy existed is that the state-
ment has a tendency to "lift itself by its own bootstraps to the
level of competent evidence." 9 It is unfortunate that the
Sixth Circuit, while carefully setting forth procedures that
would guard the defendant against possible prejudice at trial,
refused to require that the judge base his decision solely on
non-hearsay.
B. Admissions by Agents
A well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule permits
the introduction into evidence of extra-judicial admissions
made by a party-opponent. 40 An extension of this doctrine
provides that under certain circumstances, statements made
by an agent or employee of that party may likewise be intro-
37 See note 8 supra for the text of this rule.
" In support of the proposition that the judge may consider the hearsay state-
ment in making his determination, see United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 592 (5th
Cir. 1979) (Tjoflat, J., concurring); United States v. Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 12, reh.
denied, 561 F.2d 406 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978); United States
v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 n.2 (1st Cir. 1977). Contra, United States v. James,
590 F.2d at 581; United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978).
39 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942).
'1 "Admissions" have been defined as "the words or acts of a party-opponent, or
of his predecessor or representative, offered as evidence against him." McCoal, CK,
supra note 10, at 628. Admissions are sometimes regarded as exceptions to the hear-
say rule and sometimes as not constituting hearsay at all. Id. at 628-29.
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duced into evidence against the party. An agent's admission
against his principal is clearly admissible where the agent is
expressly authorized to speak on the principal's behalf.41 A
troublesome question arises, however, where the statement
sought to be introduced was made by an agent having only
the authority to act for his principal.42 In this latter situation,
the Kentucky courts have consistently held that an "acting"
agent's extra-judicial admission is admissible only if it is part
of the "res gestae," i.e., if it was made substantially contem-
poraneously with the transaction it describes and within the
performance of the agent's duties.43 This res gestae test has
been criticized as "inadequate '44 and as "a useless and mis-
leading shibboleth.
45
In attempting to apply the test, courts have been forced
to decide whether the time period contemplated by the ex-
pression "contemporaneous with" involves a few minutes,
hours, or days, and whether statements made by an employee
hired to perform a particular job are admissible where those
statements concern a matter not falling within the confines of
that job.46 Recognizing the difficulty of application of the
traditional res gestae test, the Federal Rules of Evidence
adopted a much simpler rule: "A statement is not hearsay if
•... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is . ..a
" Id. at 639. A corporate officer is a typical example of a "speaking" agent.
42 An "acting" agent is one who is hired to perform specific duties for his princi-
pal, but who has no authority to act as a spokesman for the principal. See McCoR-
MICK, supra note 10, at 640-41.
13 LAWSON, supra note 1, at 133.
44 MCCORMICK, supra note 10, at 640.
41 Preston v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 920 (1967).
"' In Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Earl's Adm'r, 94 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Ky. 1936), the
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that statements made within five to ten minutes
following an accident to the first person or persons to whom the driver talked were
admissible. Statements made 30 minutes after the accident, however, were disquali-
fied under the res gestee rule, as were statements made two or three days later. In
Niles v. Steiden Stores, 190 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Ky. 1945), plaintiff brought a negligence
action against a storekeeper when plaintiff slipped and fell on the floor of his shop. A
statement made to the plaintiff by the shop's butcher concerning the condition of the
floor was held inadmissible since the butcher's duties had nothing to do with the
floors. For a discussion of other cases dealing with the res gestae rule in Kentucky,
see LAWSON, supra note 1, at 136-38.
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statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within
the scope of his agency or employment, made during the exis-
tence of the relationship. 4 7 Two years after the effective date
of the federal rules, the Kentucky Court of Appeals applied
this approach in Jones v. Heady.4
The plaintiff, Jones, was injured in a fall on defendant
Heady's cattle guard. After the accident, Heady's employee
told Jones that the cattle guard had been broken the day
before and that he had told Heady that it should be fixed. At
trial, Jones tried to introduce the statement of the employee
as an admission against Heady. The statement was excluded
by the trial court as inadmissible hearsay. The court of ap-
peals reversed:
The statement, if the jury accepts the fact that it was made,
is an admission against the interest of the employer and as
such constitutes an exception to the rule against hearsay. A
statement made by an employee concerning a matter within
the scope of his employment soon after an accident which is
against the interest of his employer is inherently trustwor-
thy for the reason that the interest of the employee in con-
tinued employment would ordinarily prevent him from
making a false statement against the interest of the
employer.
49
The court pointed out that the Advisory Committee Note
to Rule 801(d)(2)(D) of the Federal Rules of Evidence 50 recog-
nizes a substantial trend toward the admission of employees'
statements that relate to matters within the scope of their em-
ployment. Interestingly, the court did not expressly adopt
Rule 801(d)(2)(D), nor did it reject the traditional res gestae
rule."1 The court's approval of the federal approach is unmis-
47 AmD R. EWID. 801(d)(2)(D).
48 553 S.W.2d 288 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
49 Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
50 Through an oversight, the court actually cited the "Rules of Federal Proce-
dure." Id.
51 The court did not even mention the res gestae requirement. It is difficult to
determine whether the case would have been decided differently under the res gestae
rule. The time requirement is probably met since the court indicated that the em-
ployee's statement was made at the "time and place" of the accident. Since the court
did not detail the employee's duties, however, whether the employee was speaking
[Vol. 69
SURVEY-EVIDENCE
takable, however. Only one phrase in Heady is inconsistent
with FRE 801(d)(2)(D): that an employee's statement "con-
cerning a matter within the scope of his employment [made]
soon after an accident . . . is inherently trustworthy. 5 2 The
phrase "soon after an accident" evokes the "contemporaneous
in time" concept that is characteristic of the res gestae ap-
proach. The rationale of Heady, however, is that of the fed-
eral rule, and it can be predicted with reasonable certainty
that the appellate court would, in an appropriate case, hold
admissible a non-contemporaneous statement made within
the course of employment. Heady, of course, is a court of ap-
peals case; it is possible that the Kentucky Supreme Court
may view the matter differently.
C. Declarations Against Penal Interest
In 1893, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the de-
fendant in a homicide case could not introduce evidence that
another man, on his deathbed, had confessed to committing
the crime. 3 This case established the rule that would exist in
Kentucky for the next eighty-five years, i.e., that extra-judi-
cial declarations against one's penal interest, unlike declara-
tions against one's pecuniary or proprietary interest, would
not qualify as exceptions to the hearsay rule." The Kentucky
approach was typical of the rule as it existed under the com-
mon law of most other jurisdictions in the United States.5 In
contrast to the common law doctrine, however, the Federal
Rules of Evidence provide that a declaration against one's pe-
nal interest also qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Rule 804(b)(3) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
about a matter within the scope of his employment is not known.
" 553 S.W.2d at 290 (emphasis added).
13 Davis v. Commonwealth, 23 S.W. 585 (Ky. 1893).
The Kentucky rule relating to declarations against interest was best summa-
rized in Evans v. Payne, 258 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Ky. 1953), as follows: "It is a familiar
exception to the [hearsay] rule that the declarations of persons since deceased are
admissible in evidence, provided the declarant had peculiar means of knowing the
fact stated, had no interest to misrepresent it, and it was against his pecuniary and
proprietary interest."
" McCORMICK, supra note 10, at 673.
1980-81]
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declarant is unavailable as a witness:. . . A statement which
was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declar-
ant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject him to civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasona-
ble man in his position would not have made the statement
unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to ex-
pose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to excul-
pate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating cir-
cumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement.
In 1978, the Kentucky Supreme Court again faced the is-
sue of the admissibility of declarations against penal interest.
In Crawley v. Commonwealth,56 the Court overruled eighty-
five years of case law and held that declarations against penal
interest would henceforth be admissible under the circum-
stances outlined in FRE 804(b)(3).
57
In Crawley, James Williams and Roger Crawley were con-
victed of first-degree robbery enhanced by persistent felony
charges and were each sentenced to prison terms of thirty-five
years. During a pre-trial conference, Williams had spontane-
ously stated that he and someone else had committed the rob-
bery but that the "someone else" was not Crawley. The defen-
dants were jointly tried; Williams was present in the
courtroom, but because of his assertion of his privilege not to
testify, he was unavailable for cross-examination.55 Crawley
unsuccessfully sought to introduce Williams' declaration
against interest into evidence. On appeal, Crawley contended
that the exclusion of the exculpatory evidence deprived him of
his constitutional right to present a defense and denied him a
fair trial.
The Kentucky Supreme Court noted that its practice had
long been not to recognize an exception to the hearsay rule for
declarations against penal interest. The United States Su-
50 568 S.W.2d 927 (Ky. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1119 (1979).
17 Id. at 931.
58 Prior to Crawley, a declaration against interest could not be introduced unless
the declarant was deceased at the time of trial. The Federal Rules of Evidence, as
well as most states, permit the admission of declarations against interest if the declar-
ant is unavilable for any valid reason. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 153-54.
[Vol. 69
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preme Court in Chambers v. Mississippi,5' however, had held
that strict application of such a rule could result in the depri-
vation of due process to a criminal defendant by denying him
evidence crucial to his defense.60 The defendant in Chambers,
pursuant to a limited Mississippi hearsay exception similar to
Kentucky's, had been refused the right to introduce a state-
ment made by another that he, not Chambers, was responsible
for the murder of a police officer. The Supreme Court assessed
the testimony and, finding it reliable,61 held that to deprive
the defendant of the testimony under state evidence law
would deny the defendant due process of law under the four-
teenth amendment.6 2 While recognizing Chambers' impact on
Kentucky's restricted declarations against interest exception,
the Kentucky Supreme Court was concerned that declarations
against penal interest often-lack the reliability that state-
ments against pecuniary and proprietary interest possess.63
The Court noted that FRE 804(b)(3) permits the intro-
duction of statements that could expose the declarant to crim-
inal liability, subject, however, to the following provision: "A
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability
and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthi-
ness of the statement."' Convinced that this requirement of
9 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
60 Id. at 302.
61 The Court employed a four-part analysis to determine the reliability of the
hearsay evidence in Chambers. First, the Court noted that the declarant's confessions
were made shortly after the crime had occurred. Second, each confession was corrobo-
rated by some other evidence. Third, the confessions were undeniably self-incrimina-
tory; and finally, the declarant was present in the courtroom and could have testified.
Id. at 300-01. Crawley cited this analysis with approval. 568 S.W.2d at 931.
62 410 U.S. at 302. The Court did not, however, decide whether a state's exclu-
sion of the penal interest exception might in some cases serve the valid purpose of
excluding untrustworthy testimony.
63 Exclusion, where the limitation prevails, is usually premised on the view
that admissions would lead to the frequent presentation of perjured testi-
mony to the jury. It is believed that confessions of criminal activity are
often motivated by extraneous consideration and, therefore, are not as in-
herently reliable as statements against pecuniary or proprietary interests.
568 S.W.2d at 931 (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 299-300).
6 The Kentucky Supreme Court determined that this requirement of corrobora-
tion was not met in Crawley since there was no indication that Williams had made
the statement to anyone else at any other time. 568 S.W.2d at 931.
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corroboration would provide an adequate safeguard against
the admission of inherently unreliable evidence, the Court
adopted FRE 804(b)(3) as Kentucky's new hearsay exception
for declarations against interest.
With no additional discussion, the Court also adopted the
broader unavailability requirement of Rule 804(a).65 In con-
trast to the former Kentucky practice of permitting declara-
tions against interest only in those cases where the declarant
is deceased at the time of trial, the new rule allows such decla-
rations to be introduced when the declarant is unavailable for
any valid reason. These two new rules will considerably
broaden the circumstances inder which extra-judicial state-
ments against interest will be admitted into evidence.
II. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
In Kentucky, as elsewhere, the rule is well-established
that the prosecution in a criminal case may not introduce evi-
dence of a defendant's bad character before the defendant
himself puts his character in issue.16 Similarly, a criminal de-
65 FED. R. EVID. 804(a) states:
"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant:
(1) Is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege
from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) Persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter
of his statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) Testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his
statement; or
(4) Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of
death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his state-
ment has been unable to procure his attendance (or in the case of
a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), his at-
tendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means. A
declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal,
claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the pro-
curement or wrong doing of the proponent of his statement for
the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or
testifying.
The defendant is allowed to present testimony that will prove traits of charac-
ter inconsistent with the offense charged. For example, the defendant may attempt to
prove a trait of honesty in a theft case or a trait for peace and quietude in a murder
case. The prosecution is then allowed to rebut the defendant's testimony with proof
of his trait for dishonesty or violence. In addition, testimony of a defendant's general
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fendant has the right, with certain exceptions, to conceal any
prior criminal activity from the jury.67 The reason for these
two firmly established legal principles is obvious: a jury, ex-
posed to the fact that the defendant has a character trait for
violence or a record of prior criminal activity, may determine
the defendant's guilt on the basis of these factors rather than
on the evidence produced at trial. It is generally felt that this
potential for prejudice to the defendant outweighs whatever
value the evidence of prior criminal activity might otherwise
have. Therefore, unless the defendant puts his character in is-
sue, or unless the .evidence of prior criminal conduct fits into
one of the specific exceptions to the general rule, 8 direct testi-
mony concerning the defendant's previous criminal activity is
prohibited.
This prohibition, however, provides only partial protec-
tion to defendants. Prosecutors, unable to inform the jury di-
rectly of a defendant's prior activities, have achieved the same
result by introducing photographs of the defendant taken
from police files. These photographs, characterized by the
side-to-side, front and profile shots of the face, are commonly
known as "mug shots" and are familiar to anyone who has
ever observed "wanted" posters in the post office. The infer-
ence of criminal activity raised by these photographs is ines-
capable. A jury, although never expressly informed of a defen-
dant's past criminal record, will infer a criminal record when
the prosecutor produces mug shots of the defendant. Many
state and federal courts, disturbed by this practice, have pro-
hibited or placed restrictions on the use of mug shots at
trial.6 9 The Kentucky Court of Appeals recently considered
moral character is admissible to disprove any criminal charge. LAWSON, supra note 1,
at 14-15.
17 LAWSON, supra note 1, at 18. An exception to this rule exists when such evi-
dence of prior criminal activity is being offered for the purpose of proving motive,
intent, knowledge, identity, plan or scheme, or absence of mistake. Even when such a
purpose exists, however, the trial judge has the discretionary power to exclude the
evidence if he determines that its prejudicial effect is greater than its probative value.
Id. at 19.
6 See note 67 supra for the exceptions to this rule.
" United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207 (1st Cir. 1978), aff'd after remand, 590
F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Silvers, 374 F.2d 828 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 888 (1967); State v. Cumbo, 451 P.2d 333 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969); People v.
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this problem in Redd v. Commonwealth.7 0
Redd had been found guilty and sentenced by the Chris-
tian Circuit Court to a prison term of fifteen years for the rob-
bery of a Hopkinsville, Kentucky, Minit-Mart store. On ap-
peal, Redd objected to in-court and out-of-court identification
procedures. His first objection concerned the pre-trial identifi-
cation, in which the victims of the robbery were asked to pick
the robber out of a group of police photographs and were al-
lowed to view the defendant in a police station "hold-over"
area. Recognizing the potential of these methods to "induce a
fancied recognition, ' 71 the court of appeals nevertheless re-
fused to find reversible error in Redd's case. The court found
that pre-trial identification procedures involving the use of
mug shots and the viewing of the defendant in a "hold-over"
area are often unavoidable. As long as the identification pro-
cedures are conducted in a manner that is not unduly sugges-
tive, there is no objection to their use.72
The court, however, was unable to dismiss Redd's second
allegation of error. At trial, the police detective who had in-
vestigated the robbery testified that the identification photo-
graphs that the victim had used to identify Redd were "mug
shots taken from past incidents. ' 73 These photographs were
introduced into evidence. The detective then testified that the
photo display was taken from another armed robbery that he
had been assigned to previously. The Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals reacted strongly, stating that the introduction into evi-
dence of these mug shots and the testimony relating to them
at trial were "unnecessary, inexcusable, unfair, and
reversible.
'74
While the court condemned the use of mug shots in Redd,
it did not impose a blanket prohibition against the use of po-
lice photographs at trial. Rather, the court said a balancing
process should occur in making a decision on the admissibility
Williams, 218 N.E.2d 771 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966); Blue v. State, 235 N.E.2d 471 (Ind.
1968).
70 591 S.W.2d 704 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
71 Id. at 706.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 707.
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of the photographs. This conclusion was reached four years
earlier by the Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel.
Bleimehl v. Cannon,75 cited with approval in Redd. Bleimehl
was a habeas corpus proceeding in which the petitioner chal-
lenged the admission into evidence of an entire "mug book."
The Seventh Circuit determined that the admission of the
mug book was prejudicial to the defendant. This finding, how-
ever, did not dispose of the matter. The Seventh Circuit noted
that in a habeas corpus proceeding, its task was not merely to
review the trial court's evidentiary ruling but was also to de-
cide the broader question of whether the petitioner's due pro-
cess right to a fair trial had been violated. Only if the
prejudice to the defendant could be said substantially to out-
weigh the probative value of the evidence to the jury would
the court determine that the petitioner had not received a fair
trial. In Bleimehl, the Seventh Circuit determined that the
prejudice to the defendant was secondary to the mug book's
probative value76 and thus reversed the district court's grant
of Bleimehl's habeas corpus petition. Adopting this same test,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals found that Redd's mug shot
added little probative value, but provided substantial and un-
necessary prejudice.7 7 It therefore appears that the admissibil-
ity of mug shots in a given case is to be determined by balanc-
ing the need for the evidence against the potential prejudice
to the defendant.
Although adoption of this balancing test disposed of the
question of admissibility of mug shots at trial, the Kentucky
court was concerned over the manner in which such photo-
graphs would be presented to the jury. In United States v.
Harrington,78 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
75 525 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1975).
76 The court determined that the probative value of the mug book was "critical,"
since the petitioner's defense was focused entirely upon disproving the victim's ability
to identify his assailant. The ability of the victim to pick the defendant's picture out
of the mug book, in the court's opinion, disposed of the identification issue.
7 591 S.W.2d at 708. The Kentucky court observed that Redd, unlike Bleimehl,
was a direct appeal and thus decided the case as a matter of state evidence law. The
court noted that it was likely that Redd's conviction would be reversed in a habeas
corpus proceeding, on grounds that Redd had not received a fair trial.
78 490 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1973).
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that mug shots, which are inherently indicative of past crimi-
nal behavior, can be at least partially disguised so that atten-
tion is not immediately drawn to the source of the photo-
graphs. The Harrington court went on to suggest a course of
preparation for the use of mug shots at trial which the Ken-
tucky court cited approvingly:
[T]he preferable course of action when mug-shots are to be
introduced would be to produce photographic duplicates of
the mug-shots. These copies would lack any incriminating
indicia-i.e., inscriptions or identification numbers, and they
would also avoid use of the juxtaposed full face and profile
photographic display.79
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Redd thus set forth
clear and well-developed guidelines for the use of mug shots
at trial. The initial determination of the admissibility of the
mug shots will be made by balancing the potential prejudice
to the defendant against the probative value of the evidence.
If it is determined that the probative value is such that the
photographs should be admitted, all incriminating indicia
must, if possible, be removed.
III. PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) section 421.210(4) pro-
vides that "[n]o attorney shall testify concerning a communi-
cation made to him, in his professional character, by his cli-
ent, or his advice thereon, without the client's consent." By
thus protecting private communications between an attorney
and his client, it is felt that the client will more willingly dis-
cuss with his attorney all aspects of his case, favorable and
unfavorable. Although the statute speaks expressly to commu-
nications made by a client to his attorney, the question has
frequently arisen whether the privilege also extends to state-
ments made to third parties that later are transmitted to an
attorney.80 This question often is encountered in the context
7' 591 S.W.2d at 708 (quoting U.S. v. Harrington, 490 F.2d at 495).
80 Generally, if the communication was made to a third person for the express
purpose of being transmitted to an attorney, the privilege will be sustained. Where
the communication is made in the ordinary course of business, however, with no view
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of statements made by an insured to his insurance agent con-
cerning an event that later becomes the basis of a claim cov-
ered by the insurance policy. It was this situation that the
Kentucky Supreme Court considered in its 1979 decision of
Asbury v. Beerbower.e'
In Beerbower, the defendant, Mrs. Beerbower, sought a
writ of prohibition to prevent discovery of a statement that
she had made to her liability insurance carrier following an
automobile accident. This statement had been made before
the filing of the lawsuit and before counsel had been retained
for her. Noting that Mrs. Beerbower's policy required her to
cooperate with the insurance company and that the company
was obligated to provide counsel for her, the Kentucky Su-
preme Court concluded that Mrs. Beerbower should not be
penalized for confiding in her insurance agent, saying that she
probably confided in the insurer's representative in the belief
that he would transmit the statement to an attorney on her
behalf.82 Her statement was thus protected from discovery by
the plaintiff on the grounds that it fell within the scope of the
attorney-client privilege.
3
The Kentucky Court did not elaborate on the rationale
for its decision in Beerbower.4 Other courts that have consid-
ered the question of whether statements made to an insurance
carrier are immune from discovery have reached the same
conclusion as Beerbower 5 but have provided more detailed
to future litigation, the privilege has generally been denied. 48 MICH. L. REV. 364
(1950).
81 589 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. 1979).
82 Id. at 217.
83 A privilege, though generally associated with the right of a witness to testify at
trial, applies as well to pre-trial discovery, since a party called to make discovery is a
witness. 48 MICH. L. REV. 364 (1950).
84 The Court appears to have adopted the rationale of People v. Ryan, 197
N.E.2d 15, 17 (Ill. 1964), a portion of which the Court quoted:
The insured is ordinarily not represented by counsel of his own choosing
either at the time of making the communication or during the course of
litigation. Under such circumstances we believe that the insured may prop-
erly assume that the communication is made to the insurer as an agent for
the dominant purpose of transmitting it to an attorney for the protection of
the interests of the insured.
589 S.W.2d at 217.
85 E.g., Heffron v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 339 P.2d 567, 573 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
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and persuasive explanations for their decisions. In Brakhage
v. Graff,"6 for example, the Supreme Court of Nebraska justi-
fied its result on the basis that the attorney-client privilege
extends to statements made to agents of an attorney."" Since
the statement made by the insured in Brakhage was intended
for the use of the attorneys selected by the insurer to re-
present the insured, the field claims representative was re-
garded as the attorney's agent in this matter. Similarly, in
Hollien v. Kaye,s8 statements by the defendants to their auto-
mobile liability carrier were not subject to discovery because
the communications were ultimately intended for the in-
sured's attorney. As the New York court pointed out: "The
delivery of the statements by these defendants to the carrier's
representative, whether he be a layman or lawyer, constitutes
the carrier and such representative the agent of the defen-
dants, to transmit such statements to their attorney, when he
has been selected and retained by the carrier." 9
Other cases, however, condemn the expansion of the priv-
ilege beyond the confines of the attorney's office.9 0 These lat-
ter cases deny the extension of the privilege to statements
made to insurance carriers, particularly where the statements
were made before litigation was anticipated and before coun-
sel had been retained,91 in the belief that such statements are
in the nature of reports made in the ordinary course of duty
and lack the aspect of confidentiality that the privilege seeks
to protect.
92
Interestingly, few courts that have denied the attorney-
client privilege to statements made to insurance carriers have
App. 1959); Vann v. Florida, 85 So. 2d 133, 138 (Fla. 1956); Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Cochrane, 98 N.E.2d 840, 846 (Ohio 1951).
86 206 N.W.2d 45 (Neb. 1973).
87 Id. at 48.
87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
Id. at 785.
90 Gottlieb v. Bresler, 24 F.R.D. 371, 372 (D.D.C. 1959); Matthies v. Peter F.
Connolly Co., 2 F.R.D. 277 (E.D.N.Y. 1941); Jacobi v. Podevels, 127 N.W.2d 73, 76
(Wis. 1964).
9'1 Jacobi v. Podevels, 127 N.W.2d 73, 75 (Wis. 1964).
2 Proponents of this view overlook the fact that an insured's report to her liabil-
ity insurance carrier has no value outside its use in future litigation. MCCORBAXCK,
supra note 10, at 201-02.
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considered the work product rule as an alternative theory on
which to prevent discovery.9 3 Because the work product rule
specifically exempts from discovery, under most circum-
stances, material prepared in anticipation of litigation by a
party or a representative of the party, the rule is well-tailored
to those cases in which the statement that is sought was pre-
pared by a party's insurance representative. 4 Unlike the at-
torney-client privilege, however, the work product rule pro-
vides only a qualified immunity in that if the opposing party
can demonstrate undue hardship, the court may order produc-
tion of the document 5 Further, the work product rule is only
available where the material sought is prepared in anticipa-
tion of litigation. 6 The attorney-client privilege, on the other
hand, applies to all confidential communications on legal mat-
ters. It is likely that the Kentucky Supreme Court did not
consider basing its decision on the work product theory be-
cause of these limitations. By applying the attorney-client
privilege, the Supreme Court in Beerbower provided absolute
protection from disclosure by liability insurers of statements
made by their clients following an accident.
The work product rule is actually a rule of discovery. Kentucky's rule is found
in Ky. R. Civ. P. 26.02(3)(a) and states in pertinent part:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things.. . pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by
or for that other party's representative (including his . . . insurer... )
only upon showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of
the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means.
(emphasis added)
" This rule has been applied to insurance agents' trial preparation materials in
the following cases: Bunting v. Gainsville Mach. Co., 53 F.R.D. 594, 595 (D. Del.
1971); Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, 479
F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fey v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 19 F.R.D. 526, 528 (D. Neb.
1956).
" See note 93 supra for text of the rule in Kentucky.
" Nazareth Literary & Benevolent Inst. v. Stephenson, 503 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Ky.
1973).

